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Abstract 
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Changing Religious and Political Environment, 1805-1965 
 
Willis Winfield Cumming, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
 
Supervisor:  Yoav Di-Capua 
 
Abstract: This study seeks to investigate the relationship of the religious seminary, 
Azhar, in Egypt between the years of Muhammad Ali’s reign (1805-1849), and the 1960s 
under Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970). It pays special attention to the relationship that 
developed as a result of the “Development of Azhar Law” that Nasser promulgated in 1961. 
While the change in politics and popular religious culture during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century initially created difficulties for the institution’s religious scholars 
in preserving their professional role in Egyptian society, Azhar gained a new political 
importance as a center for producing works of apology in favor of Nasser’s post-colonial 
regime.  This new relationship proved auspicious not only for the state who could rely on 
Azhar’s support against written attacks against it by Islamists, but also for the institution 
itself which gained the security of state financial support and a vested interest of the state 
in keeping the seminary graduates employed and active in social and political life. This 
transformation, although giving the institution a new political relevance, compromised its 
independence from state control to the point where it incorporated pro-state propaganda 
 v 
into its religious message. Consideration of these historical phenomena lead us to wonder 
about resulting legacy of Azhar’s religious message and the implications it has for popular 
religion and politics in Egypt. 
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 1 
Introduction:  
Azhar University is one of the oldest and most respected religious institutions in the 
Islamic world. However, there is much historiography which points toward a waning of 
its social and political importance starting from the nineteenth century onward. This trend 
in historiography explains the experience of Azhar’s ulema as one of increasing 
marginalization due to their reactionary conservatism and resistance to the Egyptian 
state’s attempt to “modernize.”1 Historians have also indicated that this “modernization” 
process, started by the Ottoman vizier Muhammad Ali when he took control of Egypt in 
1805, began a trend of looking away from the ulema in favor of those with logistical, 
political, and technical know-how to help create a militarily strong and sovereign state. 
However, this view does not accurately portray the importance of the ulema in the post-
colonial Egyptian state. While Meir Hatina has written a monograph which challenges 
the notion of the ulema in crisis after Muhammad Ali,2 this study will deal with the 
political importance of Azhar – the official center which educated and produced the 
ulema – during the Nasserist period. 
                                                 
1 This view claims that Azharite conservatism was derived not so much from religious conviction and 
opposition to “un-Islamic” practices but from a desire on the part of the ulema to protect the privileges that 
their post afforded them as a social class. Daniel Crecelius, who puts forward this idea, sees the alienation 
of the ulema from the center of political and social life in Egypt as an ongoing phenomenon that persisted 
until after the Free Officers’ revolution in 1952. Daniel Crecelius, “Nonideological Responses of the 
Egyptian Ulama to Modernization” in Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the 
Middle East since 1500, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 167-209. 
2 Meir Hatina, ‘Ulema’, Politics, and the Public Sphere: An Egyptian Perspective (Salt Lake City: 
University of Utah Press, 2010).  
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Jamal Abdel Nasser after orchestrating the coup in 1952 and during his 
presidency from 1954 until his death in 1970 anticipated the utility of the ulema and of 
Azhar to the Egyptian state. It is during this time that Egypt relied on the ulema of Azhar 
to help mold popular Islam in such a way that would give Nasser’s regime mass appeal. 
The post-colonial Egyptian state faced opposition grounded in religious exegesis from 
among its own citizenry and therefore needed Azhar as a counterweight to any 
unpopularity that these writings could engender. The ulema of Azhar therefore occupied 
a very important place in Egyptian politics and society in the post-colonial state as its 
defender. By comparing religious writings from opponents to the Egyptian state and 
Azharite scholars over the subject of Jihad, it becomes apparent that the two groups 
participated in a struggle to shape popular religion either against or for the state. In so 
doing, Azhar was able to provide a new important form of instrumentality to the state 
after having lost much of its earlier forms of instrumentality under the rule of Muhammad 
Ali, his Khedive successors and the British.  
 After outlining the historical and sociological changes that lead to Azhar’s 
increasing marginalization as a political actor in Egypt, this study seeks to compare the 
writings of Sayyid Qutb and Doctor ‘Abdel Halim Mahmud – an Azhar-trained ‘alim 
(one learned in religious matters) who later achieved the revered position of the Sheikh of 
Azhar in 1973. The writings of both of these men pertain to the concept of Jihad 
(meaning the struggle for a just cause, usually by means of combat). This concept of 
Jihad provided the staple by which Qutb justified armed rebellion against the state. Qutb 
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predicated his call to Jihad on the claim that the leaders of Arab secular states were not 
truly Muslims – though they might profess to be so – and that the state’s very existence 
constituted a form of idolatry. In so doing, Qutb shocked not only Azharites but even 
fellow members of the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore caused an ideological 
revolution in Islam. ‘Abdel Halim Mahmud, writing a few years later than Qutb in a work 
simply titled “Jihad”, treats the same subject as Qutb. Mahmud does not engage directly 
in polemics with Qutb. Yet, his writings contradict the notion that the Egyptian state is 
not a sanctioned Muslim entity or that it is inimical to Islam in any way. Rather, Mahmud 
portrays the state as the champion of Jihad and uses positivistic and religious terms 
interchangeably such as Mu’min, meaning “believer” or “faithful one”, and Muwatin , 
“citizen” – a word that in Arabic is completely devoid of any religious connotations, in 
such a way which does not differentiate the Egyptian state from an Islamic government.  
In mixing positivistic and religious terminology interchangeably and in championing the 
Arab nationalist struggle as a form of Jihad, Mahmud advanced Nasserist civic ethics and 
Egyptian national pride as an expression of Islamic piety.  
By comparing these two disparate interpretations of the nature of the Egyptian 
state, and given the timing and circumstances surrounding the production of these two 
sets of writings, this study suggests that Azhar felt compelled – auspiciously enough for 
the Egyptian state – to protect a standard of Muslim religiosity that Qutb challenged. 
Anticipating that Jihad would become a widespread trend in thought and discussion, and 
realizing the risk of Qutb’s threatening interpretation gaining currency among Egyptian 
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citizens, the state encouraged the writing of texts which would offset the direction of 
Jihad literature and make it more amenable to its purposes. Instead of advocating the 
legitimacy of one interpretation of Jihad over the other, the comparison between these 
two sets of Jihad-writings aids merely to demonstrate the Egyptian state’s sway over al-
Azhar and to show that the ulema did not continue on a path of increasing marginality in 
the post-colonial states attempt to “modernize.” 
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The Development of Reformist Thought in Egyptian Islam 
The presupposition of both Sayyid Qutb and Abdel Halim Mahmud was that a sovereign 
state – regardless of the era but specifically after the end of the British occupation of Egypt 
– must be Islamic in order to be just and in order for its subjects to practice Islam properly. 
The two writers depart from one another in their assessment of the Nasserist state’s Islamic 
character. This conversation is informed by social and political developments in Egyptian 
history in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Clark B. Lombardi indicates a rift 
between “secularist” thinkers who believed state “legitimacy” did not depend on harmony 
of its laws with shari’a law and those who maintained the opposite.3 This secularist trend 
which removed shari’a from the necessary criteria of a sovereign Egyptian state was made 
possible in part by Muhammad Ali Pasha’s bid to carve Egypt out of the Ottoman Empire 
as an independent state over which he would govern. 
 During his reign the Pasha instituted positivist law – that is to say law written 
down and codified – as opposed to the unwritten bodies of law that existed beforehand.4 
The promulgation of such positivistic law came about as an attempt by the government to 
extend its power by creating rules for new government institutions and restraining the 
population from upsetting order while measures were being taken to build a sovereign 
Egypt.5 While some qadis (or traditional Islamic judges) continued to operate as they had 
before, – practicing fiqh (jurisprudence based on the unwritten traditions of Islamic law) 
                                                 
3 Clark B. Lombardi, State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 59.  
4 Ibid, 63.  
5 A. Chris  Eccel, Egypt, Islam, and Social Change: Al-Azhar in Conflict and Accommodation (Berlin: 
Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1984), 102. 
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– other courts popped up to exercise the newly developed statutes of the state. Courts 
practicing positivistic law eventually overran the courts of qadis who practiced fiqh. 
While in the beginning of this process the official statutes were codified in a manner 
consistent with shari’a norms, the 1870s onward saw the codification of a body of law 
that possessed no ostensible basis in shari’a.6 This development led to the waning of the 
role of Islamic jurists in society and the setting-aside in general of Islam from the politics 
of Egypt’s governors.  
This stage in the development of positivistic law corresponded with – and was 
exacerbated by – the British’s take-over of the country in 1882. In 1883 the Egyptian 
government newly under the yoke of the British protectorate rejected a draft of an Islamic 
law code put forward by the Minister of Justice, Muhammad Qadiri. For nearly a century 
following this move, Egyptian law would remain largely without a shari’a-based legal 
code.7  When the Ottoman Empire fell in 1922, the British unilaterally declared the 
former Ottoman province of Egypt a constitutional monarchy and declared Egypt an 
independent nation while it retained its de facto rule over the country. The constitution 
that Britain then imposed on Egypt, while it declared Islam to be the state religion, left 
shari’a law out of the constitution.8 The absence of shari’a law from the constitution 
during the period of British colonization of Egypt and during Nasser’s rule of post-
                                                 
6 Lombardi, 67.  
7 Ibid, 72. 
8 Ibid, 102. 
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colonial Egypt constituted the basis of Qutb’s argument against the state as will be seen 
below. 
Opposition to the diminishing role of Islamic jurisprudence in societal politics 
began to take on new forms. Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) emerged as an influential 
Azhar-trained scholar who admired and sought the import of European modes of thought 
and practice. Doing so, he thought, would help Islam to “adapt to modern conditions.”9 
Some of his fatawa sought to get rid of religious obstacles that might prohibit economic 
development and the introduction of modern physical, administrative, legal, and financial 
infrastructure to Egypt.10 For instance, Abduh issued fatawa that condoned the institution 
of property insurance – practices which socially were considered against the shari’a.11 
Abduh’s reformism was an attempt to keep Islam relevant in social and political life 
while at the same time not restricting Muslim countries from gaining an equal footing 
with the more economically prosperous and militarily powerful Western European 
countries of his day. 
In order for Abduh to cause a normative change in interpreting the shari’a, he 
departed from traditional methods of deriving law. Whereas classical Sunni thinkers 
developed schools of thought or “madhhabs”, Abduh abandoned the madhhab system 
altogether. Each of the madhhabs restricted the execution of legal rulings on the basis of 
precedents set by the early jurists who developed these schools. If a qadi was faced with 
                                                 
9 Mark, Sedgwick, Muhammad Abduh (Oxford: Oneworld, 2010), 102. 
10 Ibid, 95.  
11 Ibid, 96-97. 
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a case upon which he needed to make a ruling, he would look at historical records to 
determine how the forefathers (for lack of a better term) of his madhhab treated similar 
cases. He would then make a ruling as similar as he could to the ones that he read in the 
records. Abduh, in contrast, put forward the idea that one did not need to look back at 
these precedents but rather to the original texts themselves using the practice of ijtihad, or 
the derivation of an opinion or ruling by drawing logical conclusions grounded in 
religious texts; in this way Abduh espoused a form of “utilitarian reasoning” that 
departed from the methods that the ulema had employed for centuries.12 This privileging 
of text over tradition came about as an attempt on Abduh’s part to reconcile Islam with 
the exigencies of a powerful state that could act in an efficient utilitarian fashion. The 
state would employ Islam as the basis of its laws and actions without precedential 
madhhab restrictions. Abduh’s newfound justification for – and emphasis on the 
permissibility and favorability of – ijtihad paved the way for a variety of thinkers to 
develop their own ideas based on the hadith and the Qur’an. 
Rashid Rida (1865-1935), who edited Abduh’s monthly exegetical journal al-
Manar, went even further in his conceptualization of a utilitarian method to ijtihad. Like 
Abduh, Rida rejected the restraint of precedents set by historical jurists in trying to 
understand God’s law.13 Rida even went so far as to develop criteria for ijtihad which, if 
adhered to, nullified the rulings of past mujtahids (or those who practiced ijtihad).14 This 
                                                 
12 Lombardi, 74-5. 
13 Ibid, 84.  
14 Rida maintained that the interpreter of religious law could only divine law with any certainty if the text 
was both of “indubitable authenticity” and absolutely certain in both its transmission and meaning. 
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freeing-up of religious interpretation would permit some to develop Islamic ideas of 
various persuasions. The repudiation of former opinions set the precedent by which 
Sayyid Qutb, writing in Nasser’s Egypt, could develop a text-based piece of religious 
literature that conceptually excommunicated Muslims from the faith and which employed 
Leninist rhetoric in support of state-overthrow.  
  
                                                 
Classical mujtahids would consider the text a legitimate source to use if either one of these requisites was 
fulfiled. Ibid, 85.  
 10 
Azhar before the Free Officers 
Considered one of the most important mosques and centers of religious learning in Egypt 
and the Muslim world, al-Azhar came into existence at the behest of the Fatimid ruler al-
Mu’izz li-Din Allah in 361 A.H./972 C.E. The religious scholars or ulema who studied at 
Azhar developed knowledge of the Qur’an and the hadith which was considered of very 
high importance within Muslim society. By attaining religious knowledge the ulema 
preserved the faith and guided the believers on the righteous path. Very early on in Islam 
there developed the idea that an individual’s best chance of attaining salvation in the 
afterlife depended on the righteousness of the community.15 It is in this way then that the 
ulema’s role in society was seen as an important custodial one. Their religious education, 
allowed the ulema juridical powers, and allowed the senior clerics to create a religious 
aristocracy which came with ties of patronage, marriage and nepotism.16 
 The intellectual and socio-legal developments of the nineteenth century – 
mentioned above in the previous section – affected the social prominence of these ulema 
who made their way out of Azhar. Khedive Ismail founded this institution in 1872 
seeking to combine traditional Islamic religious education with “modern, state-directed” 
education.17 The creation of Dar al-‘Ulum and the School of Judges in 1907 created a 
new administrative class that undermined the ulema of Azhar’s former social standing. A 
secular form of law that developed originally from the administrative collection of laws 
                                                 
15 Fred M. Donner, Muhammad and the Believers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 80.  
16 Hatina, 2.  
17 John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2010), 58.  
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of Muhammad Ali and his Khedival successors created a new arena of interaction for 
which the ulema of Azhar had no expertise. The first examples of a non-shari’a based 
criminal code can be seen in the Agricultural Law of 1830 which extended state power 
over rural peasantry and a penal code based on French legal traditions which was 
promulgated in 1875. Shari’a courts still existed until under Nasser but as auxiliary to the 
secular courts.  
Further evidence of the increasing stagnation of shar’i law can be seen in early 
developments under Nasser’s rule. Law 625 of 1956 gave shar’i lawyers – the vast 
majority of whom were coming from Azhar – the right to practice law in secular courts. 
He allowed them this privilege after having dissolved the parallel shari’a court system a 
year before. In spite of this privilege, the Azhar-trained religious scholars did not possess 
the requisite knowledge which would allow them to act as effective lawyers in these 
courts.18 Whereas, in earlier periods of history these scholars provided the main recourse 
for the public to seek redress for their grievances, by the post-colonial period their role 
had fallen to an alternative group of professionals trained in a secular setting. 
Two reform laws for Azhar were enacted in 1896 and 1911. These laws 
consolidated an administrative body with the Shaykh of Azhar at its head to oversee 
teaching, student affairs, exams, the hiring of staff, and general administration. These 
laws also created the Council of High Ulema whom the Shaykh could consult on legal 
                                                 
18 Eccel, 317. 
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and religious matters. They also defined the trajectory of the students’ program of study 
where one would complete the ahliyya certificate followed by the ‘alimiyya certificate 
through the course of eight years. Yet, these laws did not significantly change the content 
of instruction within the institution. Shaykh Mustafa al-Maraghi in the 1920s also tried 
unsuccessfully to incorporate new fields of study within the curriculum but other ulema 
within the institution opposed this.19 Azhar continued to follow the madhhab traditions of 
classical Islamic education which were losing their niche as new socio-political structures 
in Egypt were on the rise. 
 Regardless of a shrinking of their social function due to its eclipse by a parallel 
legal structure, the ulema retained – and still retains – a position of prominence in the 
minds of Egyptians. A sense of mysticism surrounds Azhar in part due to its over one-
thousand year-old history but also due to a sort of mystic relation between the institution 
and the divine. In religious families, the sending of to al-Azhar to become a shaykh is 
seen as a gift to God, similar in a way to an Abrahamic sacrifice. This motif of gifting a 
boy to God is popular in many Azharite life-stories.20 The power of Azharites to draw 
upon the sanctity of their institution as conceptualized in popular religious imagination 
accounts in part for the institution’s survival during a period of dramatic social change. 
The reverence that the institution commands also brings with it an authority that gives 
weight to its opinion.  
                                                 
19 Hatina, 144. 
20 Malika Zeghal, “The ‘Recentering’ of Religious Knowledge and Discourse: The Case of al-Azhar in 
Twentieth Century Egypt,” in Schooling Islam: the Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education, ed. 
Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 111. 
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 Furthermore, religious learning did not account in and of itself for the high status 
of the ulema in Egyptian society before or after Muhammad Ali. “Charisma” – or, by its 
Weberian definition, the quality by which one is held above others in popular opinion in 
such a way that suggests that they possess supernatural or special powers – assisted in 
raising the ulema to a privileged position in Egyptian society.21 This charisma depended 
in large part on the perceived benevolence of the charismatic leader toward the 
community which upheld his charismatic nature; by adhering to the popular orders of 
Sufism, for example, ulema maintained their charisma during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.22 Muhammad Khalil al-Hajrisi, for example, supported the Urabi 
Revolt23 by his support and participation in popular protest against the discriminatory 
policies of the Army and the government of Khedive Tawfiq Pasha that supported and 
sustained them; he was both a lecturer at Azhar and a prominent member of the 
Khalwatiyya Sufi order.24 Hajrisi’s championing of the Urabi revolt and membership in a 
Sufi order indicate his active participation in the life of his community in Egypt and a 
concern for the social welfare of Egyptians rather than an introverted disaffectedness and 
languor caused by a feeling of exclusion from the process of state-building. Exclusion 
                                                 
21 Hatina, 3. 
22 Ibid, 3. 
23 The Urabi revolt was a popular movement led by army officers between 1879 and 1882 against the 
Khedive of Egypt Isma’il Pasha and against his successor Tawfiq Pasha who succeeded Isma’il that same 
year. The movement expressed grievances against governmental policies that were leading the country 
toward bankruptcy and the increasing dominance of foreigners within the administrative structure of 
government. The officers also expressed indignation over the restrictions of native Arab-Egyptian officers 
from higher ranks within the army.  Hopwood, D.. "ʿUrābī Pas̲h̲a." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second 
Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 
2015. Reference. University of Texas at Austin. 20 March 2015 
24 Hatina, 60.  
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from this process did not preclude the ulema’s activism in the affairs of – nor their 
relevance to – ordinary Egyptian people.  
 During the British protectorate, the ulema worked to protect public morality 
against foreign influence and its threat to Islam. The ulema’s actions were informed by a 
belief that the survival of the faith depended upon communal morality. The only way that 
this communal morality could remain intact was if government took an active role in 
forbidding un-Islamic acts. They could countenance any form of government so long as it 
guaranteed that the Muslim community remained unexposed to corrupting influences.25 
With the advent of Western secular codes of ethical behavior – such as the permissibility 
of drinking alcohol, gambling and collecting interest on debts – during British 
colonization, Azharites tried to preserve Islamic morality through the publication of print 
media such as the publications al-Makarim al-Akhlaq al-Islamiyya (1900-?) and al-Islam 
(1894-1913). These publications gained a receptive readership throughout the country 
and started a conversation over the state of Islam under colonialism.26 The official 
Azharite periodical Nur al-Islam appeared in 1931 and was renamed Majallat al-Azhar in 
1935. The editors of this publication did much to portray Azhar as the guide and defender 
of Muslims and took an aggressive stance against foreign corrupting influences.27 All of 
these publications evaluated to their readership the moral state of Islam and urged 
Egyptians toward solutions to the moral dilemma that their community faced. Azhar 
                                                 
25 Ibid, 134.  
26 Ibid, 131-141. 
27 Ibid, 149.  
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remained a visible shaper of public opinion and popular religious thought during a period 
of rapid and stressful societal transformation. In the process of presenting itself in this 
way, Azhar appeared as a defender of the public good.  
During the 1919 popular revolt against the British in Egypt Azhari Shaykhs 
organized protests and demonstrations against their alien occupiers.28 The institution of 
Azhar itself, however, did not take up a leading role against the British, as more 
nationalist rather than religious feelings provided the impetus behind the Wafd-led 
revolt.29 Crecelius insists that the ulema remained mostly outside of the realm of politics 
by their own intransigence and conservatism after Egypt gained its resulting semi-
independent status from Britain in 1922.30 Yet, in spite of Crecelius’s insistence, the three 
principle competitors for sovereign authority in Egypt – the King, the British and the 
Parliament – each regarded the institution as an important political force that could either 
help or hurt them.  For instance, the Shaykh of Azhar during the 1920s, Mustafa al-
Maraghi proposed an educational reform law in the institution which provoked 
contestation between the King and the Wafd-led Parliament over its implementation.31 
The law would provide for the provision of non-religious sciences as the 1961 Azhar 
development law would do later under Nassir. The King sided with the stronger 
conservative elements in the institution that opposed the reform.32 The Wafd supported 
                                                 
28 Ibid, 142-3. 
29 Ibid, 142-3. 
30 Crecelius, 196. 
31 Hatina, 149.  
32 Ibid, 149. 
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reforms but feared the possibility of alienating the religious inclinations of its popular 
constituency.33 The British publicly showed respect for Azhar but feared its potential to 
galvanize anti-British sentiment.34  
During the interwar period in Egypt the ulema also engaged in debate and 
criticism of such reformists and critics as Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq and 
Taha Hussein in the years 1924, 1925 and 1926 respectively.35 The Azharites who 
engaged in these debates were attempting to assert their professional right to a monopoly 
in shaping the public discourse on religion in Egypt. The importance that the civil 
authorities in Egypt – the Parliament, the British and the King – saw in this institution, 
indicates that they considered their claim to this monopoly one deserving at least of their 
respect and consideration for its potential to affect the public order. These public debates 
clearly show that Azhar had not become an apolitical and marginal entity during the 
Liberal Era, but was still considered a potential danger if not a useful political ally.  
  
                                                 
33 Hatina, 146. 
34 Ibid, 143. The British stationed patrol men around and blocking off streets from the Azhar compound 
during the 1919 revolt.  
35 Ibid, 147 
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Azhar After the Free Officers’ Revolution 
The Free Officers Revolution took place in 1952. A contingent of officers within the 
Egyptian army led by Jamal Abdel Nasser ousted the former king of Egypt King Farouq 
and expelled the British from Egypt. The new regime took measures to bring al-Azhar 
more directly under state control. Nasser created a ministry called the Wizarat al-Awqaf 
charged with the task of looking after the religious endowments of all mosques within the 
country including al-Azhar. Law 103 of the year 1961 brought al-Azhar’s finances 
directly under the control of this ministry and created curricular changes within the 
institution. The law provided the President of the United Arab Republic (Egypt) as well 
as the Minister of Awqaf significant powers in appointing offices within the institution 
and making financial decisions.36 Not least of these appointments was that of the Grand 
Imam or Shaykh of Azhar whom the president appointed and who essentially became a 
government minister with a salary to match such a rank.37  
The law also incorporated faculties into the Azhar establishment to teach non-
religious curriculum, turning al-Azhar into a university. This meant that religious 
learning was supplemented by curriculum dealing with matters of the contemporary 
world. This move had two purposes. The first was to improve employment opportunities 
for graduating ulema. An example of this can be seen in that ulema having trouble 
competing in the law courts after 1956 benefitted from the provision of secular legal 
                                                 
36 Eccel, 499.  
37 Zeghal,118.  
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training at their institution.38 The second reason for the curricular change was that the 
transformation would provide a pretext for inserting secular ministers on the state payroll 
into the decision-making body of this institution.39 The 1961 law turned the ulema into-
state functionaries.  
Whereas prior to the 1961 law the relationship between Azhar and the political 
authorities was characterized as a partnership that could favor either the former or the 
latter, 40 the 1961 law changed the relationship in order to make the institution more 
subservient to the regime. Yet, this attempt to control the institution came with a respect 
for at least the trappings of its traditional structure which Nasser wished to modify in 
order to accommodate his vision for a sovereign and “modern” Egypt. He paired the 
ideas of islah (“reform”) and tahdith (“modernization”).41 One may find an expression of 
this pairing in his treatment of kuttabs or Azharite religious schools to prepare future 
scholars. Instead of abolishing these structures as Taha Hussein – who sought modern 
reform in Egypt and who served as the Minister of education in the two years that 
preceded the Free Officers’ coup – had advocated, Nasser replaced them with institutes 
(ma’ahid) that functioned in the same way as the Kuttabs except with better teaching 
materials and with the additional transmission of non-religious knowledge.42 Nasser 
sought to accommodate the religious and educational infrastructure that would produce 
                                                 
38 Eccel, 317-9 
39 Ibid, 499-500.  
40 Zeghal, 118. 
41 Ibid, 119. 
42 Ibid, 118-9. 
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Azhar scholars. Such an action indicates his belief not in their uselessness but in their 
serviceability. 
One of the reasons why Nasser valued Azhar and sought to exert his influence 
over the religious seminary was to shore up the state against the influence of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Hassan al-Banna a student at Dar al-‘Ulum started the Society of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. Influenced by the reformist Islamic trend, Banna and his 
society desired to transform and empower Egyptian and Muslim society by doing away 
with “objectionable” codes of morality brought by British colonialism as well as practices 
developed in the middle ages that he saw as unauthentic and pseudo-Islamic. The 
Brotherhood gained a large following among the Effendiyya class (or the literati who 
received secondary education) during the Liberal Period. The Muslim Brotherhood 
constituted a threat to Nasser because of the size of their group, its strident calls to 
implement shari’a law as the basis of all government legislation and its initial support for 
Nasser’s political rival General Muhammad Naguib who served as president of Egypt 
from 1952 to 1954.43 Azhar, with its connection in the Egyptian psyche as the retainer of 
Egypt’s Islamic past and its divine right to interpret scripture therefore could act as a 
counterweight to the formidably well organized and popular Muslim Brotherhood.  
Azhar and the Muslim Brotherhood ideologically represented two sides of popular 
religion in Egypt. The Brotherhood sought to rid the faith of accretions that developed in 
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Islamic history even before the imposition of the British Protectorate over Egypt and 
other forms of colonialism in the Middle East. Like Abduh and Rida, Banna saw the 
traditions of the Sunni madhhabs as stultifying to human reason. He maintained that these 
traditions precluded learning and the use of logic on the part of Muslims and thus 
accounted for the elaboration of practices that he saw as extraneous and harmful such as 
Sufism. In this way the Muslim Brotherhood placed itself as diametrically opposed to 
many of the elements in Azhar which as one of the oldest theological seminaries in the 
Muslim world acted as a guardian and purveyor of these disparaged traditions. Azhar and 
the Muslim Brotherhood appealed to different segments of the population. When one of 
these voices were put in competition with the other, neither one emerged as a clear 
winner. But, whereas on the one hand the Muslim Brotherhood was able to draw up a 
convincing and dynamic reinterpretation of religious texts, Azharites were able to wield 
the power of their institution’s prestige.  
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Abdel Halim Mahmud 
As demonstrated above, law 103/1961 gave the Egyptian government significant clout 
over Azhar. The control of the university’s finances and the presence of secular ministers 
within the decision-making bodies of the institution meant that Nasser’s regime could 
dictate the type of intellectual material that it produced.  The writings that came out of al-
Azhar at this time, if dealing with issues of political relevance to the regime, would have 
come from scholars whose work the High Council of Azhar Officials would have 
sanctioned. It was in this context that Abdel Halim Mahmud (1910-1978) was able to 
produce his work on Jihad.  
Mahmud received his ‘Alimiyya (a type of diploma for religious scholars) from al-
Azhar at the age of twenty-two, before moving to France to study at the Sorbonne in the 
1930s. He completed his doctorate in Oriental studies before returning to Egypt in 1940. 
Upon his return he became a lecturer at al-Azhar. In 1964 he became dean of the college 
of the Fundamentals of Religion (Ar. Usul ad-Din), then secretary general of the Islamic 
Research Academy of al-Azhar in 1968, president of al-Azhar university in 1970, 
Minister of Endowments and al-Azhar Affairs, and finally Sheikh of al-Azhar in 1973.44 
Importantly, Mahmud developed an interest in Sufism. While studying at the Sorbonne 
he wrote his dissertation on an early Sufi writer and moralist, al-Harith b. Asad al-
Muhasibi (d. 243/857). In 1960, Mahmud joined the Qadiyya-Shadhiliyya Sufi order45 
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which advocated involvement in political and communal live while downplaying 
asceticism.46 Mahmud wrote many works with the purpose of making Sufism popular in 
Egypt outside of Sufi circles, and believed Sufism to be the answer to reunite for a 
fragmented umma living in the modern world.47 His devotion to Sufism and attempt to re-
popularize it in popular religious practice might account for his popularity. That Mahmud 
acquired the title of “the al-Ghazali of the twentieth century” and that since 1979 his 
birthday has been celebrated as a mawlid (or, Sufi saint’s day of commemoration) 
indicates that Egyptians saw him as a charismatic figure in the Weberian sense of the 
word. 
Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, became a widespread form of worship in the 
Muslim world during the middle ages and continued to evolve in several different ways 
in Egyptian society at least until the early twentieth century.  Reformists saw Sufi 
practices – such as the visiting of the shrines of saints (or, ziyara) – as superstitious, 
extraneous and even detrimental to the transformation of Egyptian society, government 
and state for which they longed. Reformists expressed anti-Sufi ideas in educational 
institutions such as Dar al-Ulum and in periodicals48 and the Egyptian government before 
Nasser managed to stifle and Sufi practice in major cosmopolitan areas. Yet, in provincial 
towns and rural areas (especially in Upper Egypt) Sufi orders continued to thrive as 
public religious practice.49 For instance, Gilles Keppel even indicates that at the time 
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Mahmud was writing Sufism was still relevant in urban areas. Migrations from the 
countryside to the city brought people who were mostly illiterate and whose religious life 
had previously centered on mystical brotherhoods.50  Mahmud’s association with Sufism 
may have afforded him a significant amount of popular influence at the time that he was 
writing. Although, the illiteracy of these migrants makes the means by which they could 
become familiar with his ideas problematic, Mahmud would have been able to reach this 
audience through his radio broadcasts which also allowed him to circulate his ideas.51 
Considering the fact that his opinions appealed to a segment of the religious fabric of 
Egypt that was rather large and which the Muslim Brotherhood would not have been able 
to reach for their renunciation of Sufi practice, Mahmud’s position on Jihad and the 
Egyptian state would have been influential.  
The course of Mahmud’s career suggests a high level of trust in him on the part of 
the Egyptian state. His career flourishes in the period of time immediately following the 
Egyptian government’s extension of control over the mosque-cum-university. The 
temporal correspondence between these two phenomena suggests a penchant on his part 
for toeing the line in matters of the state’s interest. This obedience will become apparent 
when examining his work on Jihad. The first order of business, however, requires a look 
at the actual challenge Jihad literature posited against the Egyptian state. 
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Sayyid Qutb 
In 1965 the Egyptian government arrested Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) – a member of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, a journalist and writer – and several of his Muslim Brotherhood 
cohorts. The state undertook this action to prevent a possible attack on (then president) 
Jamal Abdel Nasser’s government and its apparatuses of political authority. The writings 
of Qutb, in which he laid bare a scriptural justification for the overthrow of Arab secular 
governments and the implications this interpretation had for Egypt, prompted this 
crackdown. In his book Milestones    (Ar. Al-Ma’alim fit-Tariq) and in his commentary on 
the Qur’an, In the Shade of the Qur’an (Ar., Fi Zilal al-Qur’an), Qutb extracted an overtly 
political meaning of the Qur’an’s language. From this political interpretation of scripture 
Qutb sought to convince his Muslim audience of the religious and moral imperative to 
attack and overthrow what he deemed Jahili states - a religious term used to describe the 
period of ignorance in Arabia before the advent of Islam.  
Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) graduated from Dar al-‘Ulum in Cairo in 1933. He 
became a writer among the Effendiyya (educated class of Egyptians) and produced many 
works concerning social justice as they pertained to class and Britain’s hegemony over 
Egypt and its other holdings in the Middle East. He expressed the belief that Egypt had a 
strong Eastern identity and that Egypt’s historical circumstances positioned it as the best 
possible champion for the Palestinian and other Arab causes.52  John Calvert marks 1948 
as the decisive point in time when Qutb began to address these issues through a purely 
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Islamist lens, basing the justification of his arguments on Qur’anic scripture. Within just 
a few years he would become not just a member of the Muslim Brotherhood but also a 
member of its Supreme Guidance Council. Calvert does not cite any one specific reason 
for this transformation while steering clear of the pinning it exclusively and directly on 
Qutb’s educational mission to the United states.53 An examination of his exact reasons for 
making this intellectual transition fall outside of the purview of this study. 
When the Free Officers’ Revolution occurred in Egypt – putting for the most part 
an end to British control over the country and relegating power to the military junta that 
orchestrated the coup – Qutb supported the change in leadership. He saw the coup as a 
possible prelude to incorporate Islam into the new government.54 It was not long, 
however, before relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC) – the executive body established by the Free Officers after the 
coup – went sour. A failed attempt on the life of Jamal Abdel Nasser by a member of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s secret apparatus, precipitated mass arrests of the organization’s 
members. Qutb, having served a short stint in prison in early 1954 for participating in 
protests against Egypt’s negotiations with Britain on the Suez, failed to allude the police.  
In July 1955 the court sentenced Qutb to fifteen years of hard labor at Tura prison, of 
which he would serve about nine.55 During his time in prison he became more 
radicalized. He witnessed the abuses heaped upon his fellow Muslim Brothers – 
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including a massacre of twenty-one inmates who refused to work under abusive 
conditions – and experienced the hardships of prison which a belief in him that the state 
was evil.56  He soon began writing his work, Milestones (Ar.Ma’alim fit-Tariq), and 
continued working on his work of exegesis on the Qur’an entitled In the Shade of the 
Qur’an (Ar. Fi Zilal al-Qur’an). In these works he would profess a severe dissatisfaction 
with the new order of Egyptian and Arab politics. In the pages of these books he would 
give religious justification for violent revolution.  
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Standing up to the Jahili State 
Qutb’s polemic against the Egyptian state was unique and made possible by unprecedented 
circumstances in the period of Islamic history where he found himself. With the abolition 
of the Caliphate in Turkey in 1924 by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and with the 
dramatic withdrawal of British imperial personnel and infrastructure, it seemed uncertain 
what role Islam would play in the politics of Egypt. Some Muslims like Qutb anticipated 
that the casting off of British imperial yoke would provide an opportunity to reassert 
Islamic governance. However, imperialism dismantled the sultanic form of Islamic 
governance that existed in the Middle East beforehand, precluding the possibility of its 
reassertion while leaving several in-substitutable laws as vestiges.57 Therefore, Qutb saw 
Egypt and the rest of the Arab World as falling outside of Muslim-held political territory. 
His call to fight, as he envisioned it, was not a call to rebellion; it was call to war against 
non-Muslims.  
The shari’a even since the late nineteenth century had been a matter of popular 
discussion and a source of anxiety for those who sought an independent and sovereign 
Egypt.58 Qutb took the stance that the shari’a constituted the basis of any government 
that could be truly Muslim, and, therefore, just. Qutb found a basis for this idea in the 
Qur’an. The first verse he draws upon in order to make this argument is Yusuf 40:  
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If not Him , Ye worship nothing but names which ye have named – ye and your 
fathers – for which  God hath sent down no authority: the command is for none 
but God: He hath commanded that ye worship none but Him: that is the right 
religion, but most men understand not, [Q 12:40] 
The critical part of this verse is the word “command” (Ar. “hukm”). Qutb extracts the 
most all-encompassing meaning of this word making it pertain to all law regardless of 
whether it is in a legal or moral sense of the word. Only God possesses the right to tell 
human beings how they should live and this right pertains to all aspects of human life. 
Qutb, therefore, establishes from this verse what he calls “the legislative attribute of 
God.”59 This term implies that God by his very nature makes laws for humanity and that 
human being’s should strive not to ignore this but to make it a reality. 
 One may question Qutb’s definition of the word “hukm.” The verse where one 
finds this word does not carry political or legal resonance; it appears to refer to matters 
spiritual and moral. The verse talks about “idols” instead of “rulers”, and “religion” 
instead of “government”. However, in a philological context, trying to establish a 
division of meaning between religion and governance may not prove terribly convincing 
in trying to refute the validity of Qutb’s interpretation of the word. The differentiation 
between the qualifications of “moral” and “legal” as enlightenment thinkers applied them 
to the word “law” did not exist in Arabic at the time of the Qur’an’s composition.60 One 
could not therefore say with any certainty that the word “hukm” meant the “command” of 
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either concept of “moral or legal” laws. The argument that Qutb somehow misinterprets 
the meaning of this word, therefore, cannot be substantiated. Law and the command of 
law therefore are legal and moral without either one of the two shades of meaning being 
divorced from the other.   
 One can also see Qutb’s predilection for interpreting law in political terms when 
looking at his commentary on the verses dealing with the Pharaoh the Surah of al-A’raf. 
In his treatment of verse 127 of this Surah, he states that in the Ancient Egyptian context 
worshiping Pharaoh meant to “accept his authority” to “not violate his laws” and to never 
“disobey his orders.”61 All of these definitions that Qutb gives to the meaning of 
“worship” are political. He tries deliberately not just to associate the act of worship with 
the exigencies of obedient citizenship, but to associate the tyranny of the Pharaoh to the 
tyranny of the Arab state. The Arab state commands the Arab citizen to worship it in the 
simple form of following its laws. 
` Qutb considers state worship impermissible. The obligation to respect “the 
legislative attribute of God” accompanies the obligation of Muslims to not worship and 
serve anyone but Him. Qutb quotes the Qur’an:  
O people of the Book, come to what is common between us: that we will not 
worship anyone except God, and will not associate anything with Him, and will 
not take lords from among ourselves besides God; and if they turn away then tell 
them to bear witness that we are those who have submitted to God.” (2:64) 
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According to this reasoning worship means obedience and so if one obeyed a law that 
God did not create, they then worshipped a being other than God, namely the one who 
created the obeyed law.62 In this context, a law becomes tantamount to idolatry without 
divine sanction. Qutb states, “Anyone who serves someone other than God is in this sense 
is outside God’s religion, although he may claim to profess this religion.”63 Furthermore, 
Qutb declares all “so-called” Muslim societies existing in his time period to be “jahili 
societies”64 meaning that they were pagan and idolatrous.   This claim, grounded in 
elaborate exegesis of the Qur’an, would have constituted a source of existential anxiety 
for his Muslim audience. According to this argument all Muslims lived at that time in 
Dar al-Harb but also were complicit in evil.  
 What then did it mean to Qutb for “the command to be only to God?” Qutb 
claimed that for the command to be only to God, laws had to be grounded in the Shari’a 
(or Islamic law). 65 Because the Prophet Muhammad was the last intermediary between 
God and humanity, the Shari’a as outlined in the Hadith (or sayings of the Prophet) and 
the Qur’an would provide a sufficient basis for expressing God’s will on earth in respect 
to his “legislative character.” In order to bring about this type of Shari’a-based political 
system Qutb advocated Jihad and shunned preaching. 66  Qutb stressed the necessity of 
violent Jihad, because of the violent means inherent to Jahili society. Witnessing the 
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brutality of Nasser’s regime against the Brotherhood, in the way of arrests, executions, 
and abuse in jail, he believed that the struggle for restoring Islamic governance 
necessitated “parallel resources”; preaching and peaceful means to achieve this goal 
would not suffice.67 
Qutb’s ideas, although couched in Islamic terminology, borrowed heavily from 
Leninism. He displayed in his writings a predilection for socialist thought, although he 
denounced the inherent atheism of communism. He insisted that the essential unchanging 
principle of the shari’a was “the supreme utilitarian principle requiring the maximization 
of human welfare.”68 Qutb in Ma’alim fit-Tariq called for Muslim youth to form a 
vanguard (tali’a) in order to fight a war against the “jahili” system not just in Egypt but 
throughout the world.69 Qutb imports this idea from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s book What 
Must Be Done (1902). Lenin called for the most ideologically committed and able-bodied 
youths to form a body to lead the working classes in armed revolution against the 
bourgeoisie. The violent and clandestine nature of Lenin’s proposal came within the 
context of the political environment in which he was writing. The totalitarian nature of 
Czarist Russia necessitated to Lenin the violent revolution of an elite, secret group.70 This 
justification for the vanguard must have resonated to Qutb, having witnessed and 
experienced the brutality with which the state acted toward the Muslim Brotherhood and 
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seeing as how Nasser dissolved all political parties except for the state party in 1953.71 
Qutb, impressed by Lenin’s proposal, produced a call-to-arms that consisted of the 
working of Islamic text into a revolutionary doctrine coming from outside of Islam. Qutb 
therefore bypassed the traditional methods of exegesis in order to produce what was 
essentially a fatwa and relied on what he believed to be his own means of ijtihad, –  
which he cobbled together from Lenin and the Qur’an. Qutb’s take on Jihad was a 
completely novel one predicated more so on a Leninist theoretical framework than what 
one would find before the modern period in Egypt. 
In 1964, Qutb’s Milestones was published in Cairo at the beginning of the 
Egyptian state’s clampdown on newspaper and book-publishing companies. Yet, it 
managed to gain a large audience in and outside of Egypt for its potent ideas.72 Part of the 
reason for the book’s success within Egypt was connected to the socio-economic 
situation of the country. Overstretched financially by its involvement in the Yemeni civil 
war at this time, the Egyptian state found it difficult to make good on its commitments to 
provide the generous services it had promised to its population.73 Because state finances 
were spreading increasingly thin and because it could not afford to quell public 
resentment with the provision of more jobs and servaces, it could not countenance such a 
flagrant call to arms against it as Qutb’s Milestones and In the Shade of the Qur’an.74  
The state therefore banned these books because of an awareness of its vulnerability and a 
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lack of confidence in Nasserism as a strong enough ideology to withstand these attacks in 
the minds of the Egyptian public. 
Nevertheless, the state released Qutb from prison after suffering a heart attack in 
1964 after nearly a decade of serving his sentence. He was released at the behest of Iraqi 
president ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif who was attempting to look pious in the eyes of Iraqis.75 
He did not remain outside of prison for long. Security services arrested him just months 
later for his involvement with a fledgling Islamist group which plotted to attack the 
state.76 During his trial the court indicted Qutb not just for his involvement with the 
militants but also for his subversive writings. The court sentenced him to death by 
hanging and his execution took place in August 1966.77 
Qutb’s ideas, as powerful as they were, gained popularity among only certain 
segments of the Egyptian population. It was only later on after his death that the 
popularity of these ideas would grow and become influential among disenchanted 
Islamist groups in Egypt. Furthermore, even though Qutb was a high ranking member of 
the Muslim Brotherhood his ideas never became officially part of the sanctioned ideology 
of the group. Many Muslim Brothers like the Azharites and the majority of the Egyptian 
population saw these ideas as deeply disturbing. His ideas implied that Muslims at that 
time in Egypt were living a deeply sinful life for its ‘willful blindness to God’s sovereign 
power.’78 Qutb defined the world in hard and fast distinctions between piety and 
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sinfulness, and the Egyptian state along with any form of recognition of it constituted 
idolatry. Such an extreme viewpoint implicated even the Supreme Guide of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Hassan Hudeibi – Hudeibi gained his position as Supreme Guide after 
Hassan al-Banna’s death in 1949. Hudeibi used diplomatic means of maneuvering with 
the state in order to advance the purposes and protect the rights of the group before the 
mihna or “the ordeal” which saw their mass imprisonment and persecution by the state.79 
Qutb’s call for a revolutionary Jihad led by the vanguard flew in the face of Hudeibi’s 
gradualist approach to Islamic reform. In response to Milestones and In the Shade of the 
Qur’an Hudeibi wrote Du’ah la Qudah (Preachers Not Judges) which sought to counter 
Qutb’s claims in the development of the Brotherhood’s official doctrine.80 Qutb’s ideas 
while popular among many of the Muslim Brothers did not inform the strategy of the 
main leadership within the organization. The official leadership would toe the line of 
Hudeibi’s gradualist approach even under new leadership following an amnesty by Sadat 
in the 1970s.81 
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An Azharite’s take on Jihad 
Nasser predicated the Egyptian state ideology on the premise that an elite group would 
manage its affairs while its citizenry would withdraw from politics.82 Generous welfare 
services provided a conciliation for the absence of popular participation in politics. The 
state ideology amounted to no ideology other than the belief that the state worked in the 
public’s best interest and for the goals of Pan-Arabism. Because of the financial problems 
associated with the Yemeni civil war and the increasing inability for the state to 
accommodate its growing population, as well as the crushing defeat that Egypt 
experienced in its war with Israel in 1967, the deficiencies in popular state ideology 
proved a danger to the legitimacy of Nasser’s regime. Qutb’s ideology of takfir (meaning 
the denunciation of other Muslims as infidels) and Jihad was well positioned at this time 
to gain proponents, given its condemnation of the regime that failed to fully live up to its 
obligation to the people. In order for the state to stem the growth of this threat, it coopted 
Jihad literature by relying on the writings produced by al-Azhar.  
The writings of ‘Abdel Halim Mahmud established the Egyptian state as a true 
Muslim nation and as the principle exponent of Jihad rather than the object toward which 
the violent struggle should be directed. Mahmud defined this idea in his contribution of a 
chapter to a book entitled The Desire to Fight: Jihad in the Way of God (Iradat al-Qital 
wal-Jihad fi Sabil Allah). The book was published in 1969 by Mu’asasat Dar at-Tahrir lit-
Tab’ wan-Nashr (roughly: “The House of Free Printing and Distribution”). This 
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organization was established as a media foundation of the Egyptian government. The 
book, in its two page introduction, indicates that it was written with the help of the 
Academy for Islamic Research (Majma’ al-Buhuth al-Islamiyya)83 – an Azhar body 
created under law 103 of 1961.  The Academy consists of 50 members headed by the 
Shaykh of Azhar to meet every year in order to discuss challenges to the Muslim 
community.84 While the government banned the distribution of Qutb’s works, it allowed 
and even encouraged the production and distribution of a work that also talks about 
fighting Jihad using an official government body to publish it. Jihad itself could be an 
innocuous idea for the state to endorse when presented in the right way.  
 Mahmud establishes in a manner similar to Qutb that one of the purposes for 
fighting Jihad is to establish the “oneness of God, the worship of him alone.”85 Likewise, 
Mahmud asserts that fighting in the way of Satan includes the worship of idols. However, 
whereas Qutb takes great pain in defining the meaning of what these phrases and terms 
mean in political terms, Mahmud glazes over them and pays more attention to the other 
aspects of fighting in the way of God and Satan. Fighting for the cause of God (الله ليبس يف) 
also includes honest speech, the fulfillment of duty, honoring the bonds of kinship, being 
good to your neighbor, and stopping all unlawful acts and the spilling of blood ( نع فكلا
ءامدلاو مراحملا).86 “Fighting for the cause of Satan” (ناطيش ليبس يف) includes obedience to 
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desire; controlling; taking possession of, and reducing people to slave status; and forcing 
those who are safe from their homes for no reason.87 Mahmud identifies an enemy that 
perpetrate these specific acts – especially with respect to the expulsion of those who are 
safe from their homes – which are linked to fighting for the cause of Satan. According to 
Mahmud, because Israeli’s have forced Arab Muslims from their homes in Palestine, they 
have become the enemy and it is incumbent upon all Muslims – and what he terms as “all 
Muslim countries” – to fight Israel.88 These pronouncements serve the purpose of 
affirming the Egyptian state’s legitimacy as a Muslim entity and that it also bears the 
responsibility of fighting Jihad. Additionally, these pronouncements endow one of the 
goals of the state ideology of Pan-Arabism with the sanctity of Jihad – namely, the 
liberation of Palestine from its Zionist occupiers.  
 Like Qutb, Mahmud also stresses that Jihad is a duty incumbent on each and 
every Muslim. He states that they should engage in Jihad just as much in peace time as 
well as during war, meaning that even in peace a good Muslim must prepare for war.89  
He cites stories of the prophet and his appreciation for archery and other martial arts 
(ةيبرح نونف) when demonstrating the virtue of preparedness during peacetime.90 Mahmud 
condemns the iniquity of not going to Jihad, “If a person did not perform his duty with 
regard to Jihad, then he violated a divine Islamic principle, for God enjoined Jihad and 
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warned against not doing what one is supposed to.”91 Mahmud drives this point home by 
quoting a hadith: “whoever died and has not carried out a military expedition when his 
innermost feeling told him to do so, died in a state of hypocrisy.” Ostensibly it would 
seem that Mahmud is arguing for every single Muslim to fight on the frontline with the 
enemy. However, he qualifies what it means to fight in Jihad in a very significant way:  
The believer is a fighter of Jihad (دهاجم), with his money, his spirit, his time, his 
work, and with his tongue (i.e. with what he says). He wishes for there to be Jihad 
in every aspect of his life.92 
He continues:  
The meaning of [Jihad] is not that every person irrespective of his job should drop 
what he is doing, take up arms and go to the center [of the conflict], but that the 
entire state (ةلود) should be mobilized completely for war. Work should be neatly 
ordered in such a way that Jihad becomes a goal to whose purpose all power is 
subservient.93 
These claims attempt to confer upon good civic values, obedience and patriotism a sense 
of moral high ground. Mahmud does not exclude fighting from the actual duties of Jihad 
but, of course, this fighting is through the state’s military apparatus. Content with the idea 
that they are already performing Jihad on a day to day basis, the good citizen may avoid 
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the grief of feeling that they are neglecting a spiritual duty. By helping the state they are 
helping themselves, and, most importantly, they are helping God.  
 Furthermore, one finds numerous expressions of the belief in divine favor for the 
Arab/Muslim states (of which he considers Egypt to be a part, of course) in Mahmud’s 
writings:  
Faith (ناميإ) therefore – with its preconditions to be generous with one’s money 
and spirit is the first fundamental step in the path to victory. Not only that but it is 
a step that without it there will never be a proper basis for the nations (مملأا, 
meaning “Muslim nations”) as well as their generals to take their just place 
among the states.94 
This passage suggests that cosmically the states as they were at the time of Mahmud’s 
composition of this work were set on a trajectory of greatness – or so implies the vague 
term of “take their just place.” The verse gives strong suggestion of the state’s harmony 
with the divine order of the universe. The fact that Mahmud, also, advocated faith (ناميإ) 
in the state sends a strong signal that the state acts as a legitimate exponent of God’s will.  
 Without addressing Qutb’s argument head-on and without even addressing or 
making reference to Qutb, Mahmud’s writings speak to the exact opposite of Qutb’s 
claims. To Mahmud the mundane activities of work, participation, and service toward the 
state do not constitute idolatry, as Qutb would argue. Rather, these actions lend 
themselves as acts of piety for the cause of God. Even though Mahmud does not engage 
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in polemics, and even though he does not attempt to attack and discredit Qutb’s takfiri 
arguments, he presupposes the opposite of his key point that serving the state constitutes 
reverence and worship to God and not a man-made idol. Such a work provided a much 
less galling interpretation of religious texts. It went so far as to affirm nationalistic 
sentiments as religious virtues. Given the time at which Mahmud composed this work, 
who he was, and what the state needed at the time this work came about as a counter-
measure to mitigate the circulation and damaging effects of a dissenting ideology.  
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Conclusion  
In the period that Mahmud and Qutb wrote their respective works, Nasserism had 
provided and was largely making good on promises to its citizenship for a better life. The 
ideas reflected in Mahmud’s writings did not all by themselves shape popular religiosity 
but affirmed a mindset that already existed at the time. Essentially, his chapter in Iradat 
al-Qital wal-Jihad fi Sabil Allah preached Nasserism as Islam. Qutb’s interpretations of 
scripture could not have sat well with the vast numbers of Egyptians who had confidence 
in and supported Nasser. The post-colonial state assisted its populace and initially 
provided it with a level of prosperity that made it content with the regime. If anything the 
popularity of Nasserism contained Qutb sympathizers to an ineffectual minority within 
society. Mahmud’s writings appealed to an already popular social sentiment. These 
writings, buttressed by the institutions prestigious history and lore surrounding it, 
consoled the public and affirmed their contentment and positive expectations while also 
affirming the divine sovereignty of the regime.  
This study has sought to demonstrate the Egyptian state’s ability to call upon al-
Azhar in times of political urgency. Some historians have contended that the Egyptian 
public under Nasser came to see the writings coming from al-Azhar as being of dubious 
doctrinal authenticity. Gilles Keppel assumes that this disdain on the part of Egyptians 
derived from their perception that the ulema’s rulings became corrupted by the taint of 
state patronage.95  However, during Nasser’s presidency both the state and this grand 
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religious seminary affirmed the authority of one another. Azhar could scarcely have lost 
its prestige among the majority of Muslims in Egyptian popular religious culture. While it 
is true that a fledgling religious counterculture steeped in the Enlightenment-influenced 
Islamic reformism developed at this time and that this movement increased in popularity 
in later decades due to increased migration from the countryside to the city, the 
concomitant dissolution of traditional religious structures, and a decrease in the ability of 
the state to provide promised social services to its citizenship, the ulema continued to 
galvanize Islam in the eyes of many Egyptians. The fact that in 2013, after ousting the 
Muslim Brotherhood president Muhammad Morsi from power, General Abdel Fattah as-
Sisi appeared on state television flanked by the Shaykh of Azhar, Ahmad at-Tayyib and 
the Coptic Pope Tawadros II96 indicates a continued confidence on the government’s part 
in the ability of Azhar to garner popular support just as Nasser did in the 1960s. More 
work is needed in order to explain Azhar’s influence and its relationship to the course of 
popular Islam in the decades following Nasser’s death. Such work needs to focus on how 
education and urbanization changed the religious landscape in Egypt, how Azhar fit into 
that religious culture, how it maintained its claim to represent tradition and truth in light 
of these changes, and how Azhar communicated the sovereignty of the Egyptian state in 
religious terms to the public.   
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